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What’s Governance got to do with it?
Two Investigations into the State of Atlantic Canada
WHILE DRIVING FROM HALIFAX TO FREDERICTON on 29 June 2003, I was
poignantly reminded of what policy-makers are fond of calling “the structural
adjustments” that are confronting Atlantic Canadians. Just outside of Truro, I passed
a car with Newfoundland and Labrador license plates, pulling an open trailer loaded
with household effects. Further along, there were two and then four more vehicles in
what was clearly a convoy of families making its way from the Gulf Ferry to Toronto,
Fort McMurray or some other destination where job prospects promised to be better
than at home. It was clear, too, that these were not people whose moving expenses
were generously underwritten by some corporation for whom they planned to work.
Like so many Atlantic Canadians before them, they were “goin’ down the road” to
take up the kind of employment that, given the costs of relocation, might not sustain
them much better than welfare at home.
These migrants on the Trans-Canada Highway provide a context for the
Newfoundland and Labrador Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our
Place in Canada which submitted its main report the very day following my drive to
Fredericton.1 Over the previous fourteen months, Chair Victor L. Young and his
colleagues Sister Elizabeth M. Davis and Judge James Igloliorte had worked under
considerable pressure to conduct their investigation within the time frame stipulated
by the terms of reference for the commission. In addition to a 215-page report entitled
Our Place In Canada, the commission generated 28 research papers and submissions
from two polling companies hired to conduct national and provincial surveys to probe
public opinion (Pollara and Ryan Research and Communications). For anyone
interested in accessing these resources, they are available on the Internet
(http://www.gov.nf.ca/royalcomm/). That said, I sympathize with anyone who, like
myself, is obliged to read hundreds of pages of single-spaced research prose on a
computer screen.
Royal commissions are potentially valuable in at least three ways. At best, they
produce practical recommendations that are quickly implemented. They can also
serve a political role, either to stall immediate action or to bring greater public
awareness to bear on major issues. Finally, commission reports and the research that
informs them are often a gold mine for historians. It is perhaps too soon to tell if the
report’s major recommendations, which focus on more collaborative federal-
provincial relations, will be influential with policy-makers in Ottawa. When it was
released, Our Place in Canada was greeted with a disdainful yawn in the rest of the
country – there were, after all, fires in British Columbia, a SARS outbreak in Toronto
and summer holidays on the agenda. The commissioners note optimistically (and
prophetically in the case of Newfoundland and Labrador) that “an unusual coming
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together of new governments and new leaders, both federally and provincially”,
provides a unique opportunity “to better respond to the hopes and dreams of
Canadians” (p. 8); however, hope and a narrow window of opportunity are thin
threads on which to hang major policy initiatives. Perhaps more surprisingly, Our
Place in Canada also failed to spark enthusiasm in Newfoundland and Labrador. It
played little role in the October 2003 provincial election that brought Danny Williams
and the Progressive Conservative Party to office and its major recommendations,
which were conveyed with a sense of urgency, seem to be hanging in limbo. Although
a recommendation that requires the government to assess progress on or before 30
June 2005 may kick some new life into the report, two years is a long time in politics.
Whatever the fate of the commission’s recommendations, Our Place In Canada is
destined to take its place on the shelves with the other royal commissions that have
been established to investigate the economic ills of the Atlantic Region.2 It is difficult
to say whether the report or any of the research papers will become classics, but
together they provide a wealth of information for present and future scholars
interested in conditions in Newfoundland and Labrador at the beginning of the 21st
century.3 Historians are well-represented among the academics commissioned to write
research papers. In 1997, J.R. Miller, then president of the Canadian Historical
Association, lamented “History seems to be everywhere, but the historian is becoming
invisible”.4 One of Miller’s concerns was that historians were increasingly less likely
than political scientists, economists and sociologists to be hired as consultants to
policy-makers. While it is the case that social scientists dominate the list of scholars
hired to write research papers for the commission, I counted five historians in the mix
– Melvin Baker, Gerald Bannister, Raymond Blake, Jason Churchill and Miriam
Wright. Together their reports provide a comprehensive and often highly-
sophisticated reflection on the province’s post-Confederation history. Gerald
Bannister’s essay on the politics of cultural memory is a splendid piece of writing that
may well become a classic. The other historians also tackle with considerable skill the
1945 to 1948 context of Confederation (Baker), the Smallwood years (Wright), the
history of rural and regional development policies (Blake) and the exploitation of
Labrador’s Churchill River Basin since 1949 (Churchill). Baker makes a second
contribution in the form of a 25-page chronology of Newfoundland and Labrador
history, beginning in 7000 BC.
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Given the retrospective nature of the inquiry, most of the papers are grounded in a
more or less sound reading of the recent past.5 Maura Hanrahan explores the
implications of the omission of Aboriginal peoples from the Terms of Union of 1949
that put the province’s Inuit, Innu, Métis and Mi’kmaq in a precarious position with
respect to the rights claimed by Aboriginal peoples elsewhere in Canada. In her report
on the changing role of women, Joanne Hussey argues that the contribution of women
to the economy is often overlooked, that women are especially vulnerable in the
current climate of restructuring and that policies must be introduced to meet the
particular needs of women. The commissioners recognize the importance of culture
and identity issues, topics that are addressed by Gerald Blackmore in Sense of Place:
Loss and the Newfoundland and Labrador Spirit. In part because Confederation is still
within living memory, the province’s inhabitants nurture a strong sense of their
unique identity. According to the provincial opinion survey conducted in April 2003,
72 per cent consider themselves Newfoundlanders and Labradorians first, Canadians
second. Interestingly, they told pollsters that what they most valued about being
Newfoundlanders or Labradorians was the culture, music and arts they shared (25 per
cent), along with the safe environment (20 per cent) and sense of community (14 per
cent). Although the commissioners detected a strong current of alienation in Labrador
(p. 193), they solicited no study on and offered no specific recommendations for the
region, other than more development of the Churchill River Basin, which surely
misses the point.
The majority of research papers focus on political and economic matters. To get an
“outside” perspective on the province’s position in the federal system, the
commissioners turned to Roger Gibbins of the Canada West Foundation. He
concludes that federal governance, which has been greatly transformed since 1949,
has evolved in a direction that supports the aspirations of Newfoundland and
Labrador. Donald Savoie is more critical of Ottawa and wonders if the gradual shift
from “needs” to “opportunities” in the theory driving regional development policy
over the past forty years has served the province well. For Savoie, decentralization of
responsibilities from the federal government to the provinces no longer offers as much
risk as it used to and he supports political and administrative reforms that will
encourage Ottawa to accommodate regional economic circumstances other than those
of Ontario and Quebec. Past federal-provincial agreements apparently offer no
remedy. Stephen May concludes that the 1949 Terms of Union have little practical
application to current federal-provincial relationships, while John Crosbie sees the
1985 Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord as offering fewer benefits from off-
shore oil development than the province had hoped. Other papers address the
implications for public policy of demographic trends (Craig Brett), the province’s
place in the Canadian economic union (Centre for Spatial Economics), Atlantic
Region integration options (Stephen Tomblin) and federal representation (Chris
Dunn). Two papers tackle fiscal matters (Dave Norris and Robin Boadway). While
Wade Locke and Scott Lynch examine what the province needs to know about the
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knowledge-based economy, the P.J. Gardiner Institute, Memorial University,
examines the province’s entrepreneurial success stories. Expatriate Newfoundlander
Gwynne Dyer assesses the province’s strategic position and Dennis Stairs addresses
foreign policy options. Not surprisingly, given their real and symbolic importance, the
fisheries are the focus of three studies (George Rose, Phillip Saunders and David
Vardy and Eric Dunn).
While it is no doubt true that Premier Roger Grimes hoped that the commission
would improve his political prospects – what royal commission is not motivated by
political ends? – the crisis it addresses is very real. Unemployment rates in
Newfoundland and Labrador are nearly 17 per cent, income per capita has remained
stuck below three-quarters of the national average and the population declined by a
whopping 10 per cent between 1991 and 2001, presaging a drop in representation in
the House of Commons and in transfer payments of various kinds that are based on
population. If Ontario or Quebec were experiencing similar statistical signals, Ottawa
would be compelled to declare a national state of emergency.
Conditions in Newfoundland and Labrador 54 years following Confederation in
1949 bear a remarkable resemblance to those of the three Maritime Provinces in the
1920s. A half century after the 1867 Confederation agreement, problems of structural
adjustment (and the political fall out that it inspired) in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia
and Prince Edward Island prompted the federal government in 1926 to establish a
royal commission on “Maritime Claims” chaired by Sir Andrew Rae Duncan. The
Atlantic Provinces, either singly or together, are unlikely to convince Ottawa to
dignify the region’s concerns with a royal commission in 2003, leaving
Newfoundland and Labrador to sustain the costs of the inquiry reputed to be in the
order of $3 million. Regardless of who pays the piper, the tune is the same: the need
for a better deal from Ottawa. The Maritime Claims commissioners concluded that,
while “the Maritime Provinces have not prospered and developed, either in
population, or in commercial, industrial and rural enterprise, as fully as other parts of
Canada”, they could not “take the view that Confederation is, of itself, responsible for
this fact”. Nevertheless, Maritime claims were deemed to deserve “sympathetic
consideration” in part because the fiscal capacity of Maritime governments could no
longer sustain provincial responsibilities.6 As Our Place in Canada documents, the
fiscal capacity of Newfoundland and Labrador is still a key concern.
While the federal government’s power to respond to the needs of the poorer
provinces is arguably greater today than it was three-quarters of a century ago, the
context in 2003 is no more sympathetic to Atlantic Canada. David Alexander and E.R.
Forbes warned us in the 1980s that the neo-liberal agenda would create major
challenges, not the least of which was a new north-south orientation in trade relations
that would make the Atlantic region irrelevant to empire Ontario.7 Meanwhile,
political economist Donald Savoie, who keeps a close watch on matters regional, has
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documented the ways that “governing from the centre” has halted national integration
and left Atlantic Canadians swinging in the wind of globalizing forces. With the
media focused on the Prime Minister and a few key cabinet ministers, political parties
reduced to election machines, the civil service dominated by advisors from Ontario
and Quebec, and the other provinces concentrating on their own agendas, the problem
facing researchers and policy-makers in Atlantic Canada, Savoie argued in 2000, is
how to cope with “dysfunctional national political institutions” that have little
likelihood of being reformed and in which “the national government is less and less a
major actor or, at least a vastly different one than it has been since the Second World
War”.8 The inability of Liberal MPs from the Atlantic Provinces to devise a
convincing regional program to take to the polls in the 2000 election or, it seems, in
the imminent 2004 election, serves to underscore the relative powerlessness of
regional MPs within the party that seems destined to rule Canada indefinitely.
Unlike their long-suffering and cynical Maritime cousins, Newfoundlanders and
Labradorians are still prepared to stand up and fight. The rhetoric of grievance,
gaining momentum since the cod moratorium in 1992, had reached a point by the
early 21st century where even some business leaders were beginning to sound a lot
like members of the radical wing of the Parti Québecois.9 Because of the widespread
discontent, Grimes took pains to make this commission a credible one. Its chair,
Victor Young, has impressive credentials. He had served on the province’s Treasury
Board before becoming chief executive officer of the Newfoundland and Labrador
Hydro Group of Companies and then chief executive officer of Fisheries Products
International. In her position as chief executive officer of the Health Care Corporation
of St. John’s, Sister Elizabeth Davis had wrestled with the difficult reorganization of
the health care system. Judge James Igloliorte’s distinguished legal career included
membership on the team negotiating Labrador Inuit land claims with Canada. No
slouches, these high-profile individuals knew that their task was to preside over a
people’s royal commission, not one confined to entrepreneurs, lawyers and
academics. The commissioners met with over 2,500 people at hearings at home and
in Fort McMurray and Toronto and received some 250 written submissions. When it
became apparent that women were underrepresented, and largely voiceless when in
attendance at hearings, separate meetings were arranged. Efforts were made to elicit
responses from Aboriginal people and students. Although entrepreneurs were singled
out for consultation, labour unions, it appears, were not; unions did, however, submit
briefs. A series of roundtables sought advice on the fisheries, research, the voluntary
sector, expectations of Confederation, and culture and heritage. Women, religious
leaders and young adults were also the focus of roundtable discussions. If the
commission were to fail, it would not be for lack of inclusivity.
Nor would it be for lack of clarity. This is a lucid document mercifully free of
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jargon. We are told bluntly that “Newfoundlanders and Labradorians feel ignored,
misunderstood and unappreciated by their federal government and, to a lesser extent,
by other Canadians”, and that there “is a deep concern that a future of prosperity and
self-reliance is not achievable within the Canada of today” (p. 2). Other than the
generally depressed state of the provincial economy and the looming debt crisis, three
issues in particular fuel provincial passions: the Churchill Falls agreement that
benefits Quebec more than Newfoundland and Labrador, the fact that Canada is the
primary beneficiary of offshore oil resources, and the disappearance of the fishery
under the federal government’s watch. Despite these tragedies, the commissioners are
quick to point out that bitterness “should not be mistaken for regret or loss of hope”.
“The vast majority of people”, we are told, “believe in the underlying premise of this
Commission – that change, both in our circumstances and in our relationship with
Canada is possible” (p. 2). The statistics gathered for this investigative exercise
confirm that the majority of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians are not in the mood
to declare independence. Only 12 per cent thought separation from Canada was a
viable option.
The Pollara survey documents the stereotypical view of the province that seems to
be a major stumbling block to federal action. When asked to identify the greatest
contribution of Newfoundland and Labrador to Confederation, one in three Canadians
(34 per cent) could think of nothing to say. A majority of Canadians outside of the
Atlantic region feel that their province contributes more to Canada than does
Newfoundland and Labrador. Sadly, the most commonly held impression (21 per
cent) of the province’s inhabitants by other Canadians is that they are
“uneducated/stupid/unskilled/unsophisticated”. In short, the pollsters conclude,
“Newfoundland and Labrador may be well-known to Canadians”, but “it is not
known-well”.10
Like the Maritime Claims commission, this one can be criticized for pulling its
punches. The benefits from Confederation are duly acknowledged (better health care,
education, social services and development expenditures), and there is little support
for going toe-to-toe with Ottawa.11 Recognizing that intergovernmental agreements
and cooperation have served the province reasonably well since 1949 (for example,
the General Development Agreements, the 1985 Atlantic Accord and the 1995
Agreement on Internal Trade), the commissioners argue that “more collaborative
relationships, not less, are required in the future” (p. 85). For the most part, the
commissioners have taken a middle road, their slogan being “No to Separation! No to
Status Quo”. What they want is a new partnership that will address the fact that
Newfoundland and Labrador is currently at the bottom of the provincial ladder and
locked in a cycle of dependency.
Given the general stress on provincial budgets, many other provinces will no doubt
endorse several of the commission’s recommendations, among them an elected and
equal Senate, regularly scheduled First Ministers’ Meetings, an improved equalization
formula and increased Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) payments. In
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taking up Newfoundland and Labrador’s specific grievances, the commissioners call
for a federal-provincial Action Team on the fisheries with a six-month mandate to
develop a comprehensive action plan, immediate negotiations to revise the Atlantic
Accord to ensure that a greater share of the oil revenues go to the province, and federal
participation in the development of the Gull Island hydroelectric site on the Lower
Churchill River. They also appeal to Ottawa to address the rights and entitlements of
Aboriginal peoples in Newfoundland and Labrador who were omitted from the Terms
of Union of 1949.
Making nice with Ottawa does not always go down well at home. In a Globe and
Mail report, historian John Fitzgerald is quoted as being disappointed that the
commissioners resisted producing a balance sheet to show how much the province
pays into and how much it gets out of Confederation.12 The commissioners concluded
that battling over balance sheets was not a constructive approach: “A balance sheet
that focuses only on dollars given and received is not only incomplete but, more
importantly, diverts the attention of governments from building a new relationship
directed towards enabling the province to end its dependency, and the country as a
whole, to work better for Canadians” (p. 33). Provincial concerns are front and centre
in the report, which is presumably why the other Atlantic provinces, whose fiscal need
is nearly as great as that of Newfoundland and Labrador, were not invited to
participate in the investigation and why the commissioners reject the “Atlantic
region” policy of the federal government: 
It [the Atlantic region approach] speaks volumes about our place in Canada.
It reinforces the view that this place does not merit full provincial status and
that provincial borders in the “Atlantic” should dissolve. And, of course,
when we are continually integrated with the Maritimes, our true needs and
aspirations are often rendered invisible. Most tellingly, it enables federal
bureaucrats and, increasingly, federal politicians to claim that if it has been
done in and for Halifax or Moncton, somehow it has also been done in
Newfoundland and Labrador (p. 84).
Among the recommendations for a new strategy for intergovernmental relations, the
Commission encourages the building of a tripartite partnership with Québec and the
federal government on hydroelectric developments in Labrador. Little is said about
the potential of closer cooperation among the Atlantic Provinces on the fisheries,
offshore oil and natural gas development, environmental issues, gender equality or
any other matter. Although evidence gathered by Larry Felt for his research paper,
Small, Isolated, and Successful: Lessons from Small, Isolated Societies of the North
Atlantic, is suggestive on many fronts – why is it that the Scandinavian countries seem
to do better than the equally-well resourced Atlantic Provinces? – the commissioners
have their sights firmly fixed on reformed federal-provincial relations as the solution
to the province’s difficulties. Only time will tell whether they will be rewarded for
their single-minded focus.
There may be some basis for optimism. Within a generation of the Maritime
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Claims commission, Ottawa and a majority of the provinces came to the grudging
conclusion that federal-provincial relations required more flexibility if human well-
being, so badly served during the Great Depression of the 1930s, was to be
fundamental to Canadian governance. A federal Royal Commission on Dominion-
Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois), appointed in 1937, addressed the problem of the
relative powers of Ottawa and the provinces. When Newfoundland and Labrador
entered Confederation, welfare state measures, equalization payments and regional
development programs were being debated and implemented. Governance, it seems,
had something to do with it, and royal commissions, both provincial and federal,
helped to nurture political and public opinion to new ways of thinking about Canadian
federalism.13
“Good governance” is a main focus of Our Place in Canada, and it is also the
preoccupation of a report submitted to the Cape Breton Municipality in October
2003.14 The 158-page discussion paper prepared by Wade Locke and Stephen G.
Tomblin, a pair of Memorial University-based professors, explores the role that
reformed governing structures might play in improving Cape Breton’s prospects. In
addressing this question, they employ a broad definition of governance that includes
the institutions, processes and conventions that determine how power is exercised,
how important decisions affecting society are made and how various interests are
accorded a place in such decisions (pp. 16-17). They point out that bringing about a
“regime change” is a complex matter and one not easily achieved. Not only does there
have to be a crisis and an obvious policy direction, but also a situation in which the
old regime is unable to adjust to new circumstances and a new credible regime is
waiting in the wings capable of bringing diverse interests together to achieve a new
common objective (p. 19).
The evidence provided in this study points to the potential of more comparative
analyses across the Atlantic Region. Like Newfoundland and Labrador, Cape Breton
has a high unemployment rate (averaging over 18 per cent in the period from 1975 to
2002), a low per capita income and in, the decade from 1991 and 2001, lost nearly
nine per cent of its population. The authors conclude that “Cape Breton is not
sustainable as a meaningful economic entity under the current governance
arrangement. If nothing is done the long-term viability of Cape Breton is in question”
(p. ii). As with Newfoundland and Labrador, the crisis condition is a stimulus to
change, but what direction it should take is not altogether clear.
Locke and Tomblin are prepared to range widely in their discussion of governance
options. In addition to the status quo and provincial status, they consider “territorial
status, a Cape Breton Assembly that is similar in structure to the Scottish Assembly,
a modified power sharing arrangement drawing on the principle of subsidiarity
proposed by the Graham Commission, a tri-level of governance involving the region,
provincial and national governments and an evolutionary process that involves
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progressive, but incremental changes to the status quo” (p. iii).15 They are also
prepared to show us the numbers. According to their calculations, “an independent
Cape Breton with full provincial status would have sufficient resources to meet its
expenditure commitments” and have a surplus of $12 million (p. ii). I am no
economist, but it seems to me that the added costs of developing a provincial
administrative apparatus would quickly wipe out this modest surplus. In any event,
the failure (refusal? inability?) of the Nova Scotia government to share information
not already in the public domain, make these financial conclusions tentative at best.
In laying out the options for Cape Bretoners to ponder, Locke and Tomblin suggest
that major constitutional departures are not likely to succeed. What is now required,
they conclude, is finding new ways to renew Cape Breton based on governance
structures that do not promote territorial and jurisdictional competition. The biggest
challenge facing the island involves building a common vision and cooperative
networks, and in particular mitigating the rivalry between Sydney and Port
Hawkesbury. The authors conclude that “Cape Breton is more an idea than an
institutional reality” (p. 62), and unless people living on the island can get beyond
their internal divisions and their feelings of dependency and powerless, they are
unlikely to succeed under any political system. “Cooperation, not competition, is vital
to survival” (p. iii).
Since Locke and Tomblin were involved in writing research papers for the
Newfoundland and Labrador Royal Commission, they may well have been influenced
by the vision that inspired the recommendations found in Our Place in Canada. It is
difficult to miss the emphasis on cooperation in both documents. Equally interesting
is the absence in both documents of any serious discussion of provincial and sub-
regional fortunes within the context of a reinvented Atlantic region. The focus is
provincial and national, even international, but not regional. Although Ottawa has
spent the last half century operating on an Atlantic regional model and the new
Council of Atlantic Premiers, launched in 2000, has released a document entitled
Working Together for Atlantic Canada, regionalism seems to have lost its ability to
inspire the imagination of investigators.16 Why is it that the cooperation and
collaboration across federal-provincial jurisdictions does not apply equally to the
region as a whole?
In my classes on Atlantic Canada history, my students (no doubt influenced by the
era in which they grew up and their tendency to range broadly across the region)
wonder why the wealth from offshore oil, tourism and other economic enterprises are
not shared within the region, benefiting such areas as northern New Brunswick, Cape
Breton and Labrador before being siphoned off to Ottawa. It may be the case, as the
Newfoundland and Labrador commissioners concluded, that such a rigid “regional”
approach would probably not serve the Atlantic provinces very well in the current
federal-provincial framework; it could, however, as Frank McKenna noted some two
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years ago, have merit in certain circumstances.17 At the very least, there would be
cooperation in a context where negative stereotypes were less powerful. At a time
when all things in Canada are regional, we seem determined to squander a potential
axis of power. 
The Western Provinces are not so short-sighted. Gerald Freisen maintains that in
recent years the notion of a geographic Prairie West has given way to a single Western
region that includes British Columbia. The new “political West”, is much more
important than the community labelled “prairies”, Friesen claims, and now operates,
if not on a formal or imagined level, at least on a functional one as represented, for
example, in the Canadian Alliance Party.18
The Atlantic Provinces need not, indeed I would argue should not, follow the
model of the Western provinces; but we need to recognize that our geopolitical
context is changing. As a region bounded by the Atlantic, with four component
provinces, seven or more geo-cultural identities (among them Cape Breton and
Labrador) and three major cities (Halifax, Moncton and St. John’s), the people of
Atlantic Canada may be lurching toward a new imagined community; however, it is
one that seems incapable of the kind of cooperation that would really make a
functional difference. This is a great pity, especially for the families that will be
hitting the Trans-Canada Highway once school is out next June.
MARGARET CONRAD
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